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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2006

Networks Performance and Contractual Design: Empirical Evidence from Franchising

Abstract

This article deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining contracts for the retailers favor a better performance at the network level
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Dates and versions

ujm-00070949 , version 1 (22-05-2006)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : ujm-00070949 , version 1

Cite

Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo. Networks Performance and Contractual Design: Empirical Evidence from Franchising. 2006. ⟨ujm-00070949⟩
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