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Journal Articles Revue d'économie industrielle Year : 2006

Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot

Abstract

This paper examines a recurrent oligopoly game, where firms imitate the most successful behaviors in their memory. We intend to characterize stochastically stable states. Several models are considered which differ in the specification of players' memory. We note that the specification of memory plays a key role in the selection of the stochastically stable states. Moreover, in most cases, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not the unique stochastically stable state, and there exist cases where this equilibrium does not belong to the set of stochastically stable states.
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Dates and versions

ujm-00121658 , version 1 (21-12-2006)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : ujm-00121658 , version 1

Cite

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard. Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot. Revue d'économie industrielle , 2006, 114-115, pp.161-183. ⟨ujm-00121658⟩
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